A new phase in Sudan’s civil war

INTERVIEW | On March 26, Sudanese army forces reclaimed control over the presidential palace in central Khartoum, dislodging the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia and claiming a major new tactical and strategic victory that could signal a new phase of the war. With the army now on the verge of reclaiming the entirety of the capital and pushing the RSF back into their stronghold of Darfur, conditions could emerge for millions of displaced Sudanese to return home and avert impending famine conditions that are gripping nearly one-third of the country. This shift in momentum is also the first opportunity for the Trump administration to use its leverage with regional and Gulf state allies to help press for a ceasefire, explains Cameron Hudson, senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

What is the current status of Sudan’s civil war?

The war in Sudan is approaching its two-year anniversary next month and is entering a new though perhaps equally dangerous phase. Sudan’s army has continued its momentum-shifting offensive of the past several months, retaking the country’s presidential palace in the central part of the capital city, Khartoum. This was the last remaining holdout of the RSF militia and the biggest symbolic prize in the war so far for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) who were dislodged from the capital in the first weeks of fighting.

But at the same time that many civilians are celebrating the army’s important symbolic prize, humanitarian conditions in the country continue to worsen with more than 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and 13 million people displaced from their homes. Famine warnings are now in place for 5 of Sudan’s 18 states, including the capital, and international humanitarian assistance is both struggling to get through and in insufficient supply, increasing the likelihood of widespread starvation deaths in 2025. Last year, the UN’s $4 billion appeal for Sudan was only 50 percent met and this year the demand has increased an additional 50 percent to $6 billion suggesting that the assistance gap is only likely to grow unless international efforts to respond are increased.

What is the significance of Sudan’s army reclaiming the Republican Palace?

The army’s success is both a tactical and strategic victory over the RSF militia that has controlled Khartoum since succeeding in driving the army out of the capital in the early days of the war. The RSF is still in control of much of the city’s southern suburbs, so the overall effort to reclaim total control over the capital is not yet complete. Still, the presidential palace is an important, symbolic prize and reflects the SAF’s increasing momentum in driving the RSF out of its strategic strongholds in the central and eastern portions of the country.

But with this victory comes new pressure on the army to create the conditions necessary for the alleviation of humanitarian suffering and the return of the millions of Khartoumites who remain displaced across the country and the wider region. Army officials have been promising civilians a swift return to their homes and a chance to start rebuilding their lives once Khartoum was retaken. As they near that goal, they will be pressed to begin restoring essential services like water and electricity, which remain cut off to most of the capital, as well as delivering food aid and opening transport routes for markets to reopen.

Given these pressures, the army has given indications that it could announce within the coming days or weeks the appointment of a new technocratic, civilian transitional government to oversee these essential tasks. Properly empowered, such a body could, in the near term, facilitate the restoration of services and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the capital, accelerate the return of civilians to their homes, and help avert the impending famine the capital faces. This would represent a dramatic shift from the humanitarian and displacement crises that have gripped the country for nearly two years.

What is likely to come next in the conflict?

The momentum shift in fighting in favour of the army in recent months has been driven by the SAF’s aggressive rearmament and recruitment program that has seen it return to its full strength for the first time since the start of the war. In recent months, the army has been on a buying spree, obtaining highly effective TB2 drones from Turkey as well as new fighter jets and other heavy armaments from China and Russia. It has also succeeded in out-recruiting the RSF, with many critical that they have become overly reliant on Islamist militias backed by the former regime of Omar al-Bashir in what could result in an effort by those elements to attempt a return to power at the war’s close.

At the same time, weaknesses in the RSF’s tactics, in particular its inability to maintain supply lines across the vast areas of the country previously under its control, all remain and are likely to accelerate the army’s retaking of the central and eastern portions of the country. Tactically, the RSF is likely to continue to fall back to its western stronghold in the Darfur region, likely attempting to complete its long-running siege on the north Darfur capital of El Fasher, the only city in the region not fully under RSF control. Such a siege would have potentially catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the more than 1 million internally displaced sheltering in camps around the city. Under a scenario where the city falls to the RSF, the result would be a de facto and seemingly de jure bifurcation of the country, with the RSF having already declared last month its own parallel government. Very soon, Sudan could face a Libya-like scenario with two separate governments vying for recognition and credibility based on their authority over different regions.

What are the prospects for peace going forward?

Neither side in Sudan’s war has given any suggestion that they are interested in a negotiated settlement to end the conflict. But with prospects for mass famine, a divided country, and competing governments fast approaching, now is perhaps the best moment in nearly two years of fighting to push the parties and their backers to de-escalate.

Since the outset of the war, international attention has largely been captured by higher-profile conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, leaving the neighbuoring states and regional Gulf actors largely a free hand to meddle, profit, and shape the conflict’s outcome to their benefit. International and regional institutions like the UN and the African Union have likewise been heavily criticised for their mostly hands-off approach to the fighting. That leaves open the possibility of a mostly Western coalition of states seizing this moment to engage neighboring and regional states, along with the parties, to find a way forward that saves lives while acknowledging all sides’ interests in the war’s outcome.

Unfortunately, powers like the United States and the United Kingdom have thus far chosen to either not engage or to avoid taking sides among Gulf state allies involved in supporting or financially benefiting from the conflict. An upcoming donor conference in London next month presents an opportunity for such an engagement, but only if it includes the parties to the conflict who are not presently invited.

What is the U.S. policy toward Sudan under the Trump administration?

The Trump administration has thus far given little indication as to which way it will lean in Sudan’s conflict. In his Senate confirmation hearing last month, Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested he would take a hard line on the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s long-running financial and military support to the RSF, which many argue is today the principal driver of the conflict. However, in a visit last week to Washington by the UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan no indication emerged that Sudan was a topic of discussion. Instead, attention was focused on the UAE’s announced pledge to invest $1.4 trillion over 10 years in the United States.

The only other statement made by Trump’s secretary of state was in rejection of the RSF’s announcement of a competing government and constitutional document earlier this month. That statement, denying the RSF much-needed legitimacy and implicitly acknowledging the army’s constitutional role, at a minimum suggests a break with past Biden administration policy to treat the parties to the conflict as equally culpable and equally illegitimate. That approach did little to create dialogue with the army and prevented the United States from using its leverage to help advance a peace process. But with the army retaking the capital, and even appoint a new civilian government, Washington would be well advised to rebuild its ties to the army and use its relationships with important Gulf actors to finally begin to advance a fragile peace process in Sudan before the war takes another new turn.

*****

Source: Centre for Strategic & International Studies