Besigye reloaded

Strategy not tactics

After Besigye’s humiliating defeat in Feb. 2011, Museveni became more open-minded about retiring; something he has been willing to and actually even discussed with a number of people.

But that is when the Walk-to-Work protests began. Besigye has used the protests skilfully to regain his magic, reposition himself as the effective challenger to Museveni and in the process may render his presidential candidature for 2016 inevitable.

Besigye’s tenure as FDC president ends in 2014 but the FDC party constitution does not bar him from running again as FDC presidential candidate in 2016.

There is also a concern in NRM and FDC that even if Besigye respects the term limits and does not exploit the window in his party constitution, he may use his new-found magic to greatly influence who succeeds him as the next presidential candidate for the party.

Therefore, the current efforts by the security services to suppress Besigye and yet allow Maj. Gen. Mugisha Muntu to protest freely in the Walk-to-Work campaign reflect NRM’s attempt to shape the leadership in the FDC. Ruling party insiders believe that they can defeat Muntu without Museveni as their candidate; so Muntu’s candidature works in NRM’s favour. However, even if the NRM candidate in such a race was Museveni, NRM insiders say if he lost the election, the President would feel comfortable handing power to Muntu; so Muntu’s candidature could end the bitter rivalry between Museveni and Besigye.

Yet Besigye’s campaign could only win tactical value. His lack of an alternative policy agenda combined with the underdevelopment of his own organisational capacity renders difficult his ability to dislodge Museveni in the short term. Unfortunately, Museveni’s response to Besigye’s campaign and the way he has conducted is also tactical; it lacks strategy or a strategic objective. The irony is that it is the government’s particular response to him that may build the conditions that will help Besigye develop a message, mobilise resources and bolster his party’s organisational capabilities to press forth his cause.

Museveni must be aware that currently, Besigye lacks the organisational infrastructure to mobilise people, control their actions and lead them to a set destination.

Whenever he decides to walk, he attracts large crowds of idle youths – unemployed and bored – looking for something to excite them. Many of them are not necessarily his supporters. They are people trying to escape redundancy and boredom, get an opportunity to loot and in the process get something to eat.

And here lies Besigye’s vulnerability too; for this form of protest is a double-edged sword. For example, he has no control over his own crowds because he has not organised them. And these are youths with nothing to lose in riots, and everything to gain. The danger is that if they indulge in looting, they may scare the very social forces that Besigye needs to mobilise for his struggle. For instance if they destroy people’s property – the rich, the middle classes, the small kiosk owner, the woman with a stall in the market etc – all these people may ironically turn to Museveni asking him to deploy the police and army to protect their property.

The rescue for Besigye has to come from an unexpected quarter. Almost a month since the Walk-to-Work campaign began, Besigye had been able to largely attract idlers; very few professionals joined. The longer they have lasted, the more they have appealed to this latter group. Since then, lawyers and women groups have joined in. If these more sophisticated people increase their presence in the campaign, they are likely to bolster its organisational capability and turn into a more disciplined, focused and well run operation.

This new infusion of energy into Besigye’s campaign will find a fertile ground for political reform. Across the country’s political spectrum is a consensus that the country needs political dialogue. Those who prefer it inside NRM are still afraid to do so openly because Museveni still carries the myth of invincibility. So, NRM insiders are still weighing their options.

On the other hand Besigye’s profile and methods do not promote such dialogue. So forces were assembling in FDC to wrestle control from him. However, Besigye has skilfully used the current crisis to make himself the most popular figure in opposition politics. Those scheming against him are now in retreat.

The current contests are likely to have powerful implications on the future. If Museveni sustains his brutal assaults against Besigye, he will sustain him as the most popular figure in Uganda’s opposition politics. This may make inevitable his stay at the helm of FDC. By 2016, Besigye may be so popular that the opposition realise the only chance to win the presidential election is to field him – again.

However, if the opposition adopt Besigye as their joint presidential candidate in 2016, the NRM may realise that the only chance they have to defeat him is to field Museveni. And if this happens, it will have fundamentally altered the trajectory of Uganda’s politics. Because the 2011 elections were a turning point in Ugandan politics not because Museveni reversed the election trends per se, but because the utter defeat of Besigye pointed to a new way forward for a national political debate that is not hostage to the all-eclipsing Museveni-Besigye battle for supremacy. For the first time in years it looked like the battle does not have to be a boxing match pitting Museveni against Besigye.

Thus, there was that possibility that maybe these two men do not have to dominate the political sphere anymore. Many had hoped that if the elephants stop fighting the grass can grow. After Besigye’s miserable electoral showing, Museveni began to see his archrival as never being able to achieve what he would have wanted to achieve (beating him at the ballot), and this had given Museveni comfort, making him toy with the idea of relinquishing the presidency. Having demonstrated his dominance vis-à-vis Besigye, Museveni was amenable to the idea or possibility of comfortably stepping aside, with his “legacy”, or perhaps ego, intact.

The massive victory of Museveni over Besigye had transformed the political terrain, making it seem possible that the country can actually get new political players and begin to move to a different direction. Somehow, both Museveni and Besigye have worked themselves back to the centre, a factor that may make 2016 a replay of 2001, 2006 and 2011.

The lesson is that anyone who wants to promote the cause of political reform in Uganda has to take a very long term view – looking beyond the immediate horrors by the police to the final objective of a democratic and stable Uganda. That objective can only be possible if both Museveni and Besigye leave the political scene. This also means that such a leader (or leaders) has to resist the temptation of being sidetracked by current events in order to keep his (their) eyes firmly fixed on that distant objective.