DR Congo’s Crisis

Time for Dialogue, Not War

ANALYSIS | MELODY CHIRONDA | The DR Congo’s ongoing crisis, fueled by the M23’s advances and regional rivalries, demands urgent action to prevent further escalation

“I think we’re now at a point where we really have to make some strong decisions about what happens next. That will determine, to a larger extent, whether we have a full-scale war or whether we can still resolve this politically and not militarily,” said Stephanie Walters, Senior Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and Research and Editorial Director at Okapi Consulting.

As the conflict intensifies, critical questions arise: What are the implications for the Great Lakes region? What drives the violence, and what steps are needed to de-escalate the crisis while addressing its deep-rooted causes? Against this backdrop, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation convened a seminar titled DR Congo’s Vicious Circle – Malicious Resources and Instability in the Great Lakes to explore the complex dynamics of the conflict and identify opportunities for peaceful resolution.

Jakob Kerstan, Resident Representative for the DR Congo at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, echoed this sentiment: “the Congolese army is too weak, and we can see it every single day. There’s no military solution to this. Kinshasa must negotiate with the M23, but also address the broader regional dynamics that fuel this conflict.”

Fred Bauma, Congolese activist and Director of the Ebuteli Institute, warned of the escalating regional dimensions of the crisis. “What was so far mostly a Congolese conflict is becoming more and more a regional one. If we don’t act decisively, we are heading toward an open regional war,” said Bauma.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), a vast and resource-rich nation with strategic geographical significance, symbolizes Africa’s potential. Despite its immense potential, the DR Congo has faced decades of unrelenting conflict, which has shattered its security and governance systems, forced millions from their homes, and stifled economic growth. The resurgence of the M23 rebel group backed by Rwanda in 2021, alongside allegations of external involvement, has further intensified violence and territorial disputes, particularly in the eastern regions. For three decades, the eastern part of the country has been chronically unstable.

The M23 group demonstrated significant military strength over the past year and has gained significant territorial control. The crisis deepened in January 2025 when M23 captured Goma, a strategic city in North Kivu, resulting in the deaths of 14 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) soldiers and heightening tensions between South Africa and Rwanda.

“Kinshasa is not in a militarily strong position; it’s in a militarily very weak position.”

Walters said that Kinshasa remains heavily reliant on a military approach, despite its evident weaknesses. The Congolese army, she said, is “very weak, poorly disciplined, badly trained, and badly resourced,” necessitating external support from forces like the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), UNESCO, SADC force in DR Congo (SAMIDRC), and even mercenaries – though the latter recently withdrew.

“They also are fighting alongside the Wazalendo, who are the enemies of Kinshasa not very long ago, but who have now got a common enemy in the M23. So this is sort of the coalition of groups that’s been working with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC),” she said.

“We need Kinshasa to come to the table with the M23,” she said, “but also for international actors to speak plainly and to address very clearly, in the different processes, the role that Rwanda is playing.”

Jakob Kerstan, Resident Representative for the DR Congo at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, said that the Kinshasa government is facing mounting pressure to engage in direct negotiations with the M23. “I think the government in Kinshasa is going towards a dead end with saying that they are not negotiating directly with the M23,” he said. However, he said the recent developments, such as a delegation from the Catholic and Protestant churches engaging with the M23 in Goma, is a sign of growing calls for dialogue.

Kerstan said that the Congolese government fears infiltration by Rwanda into its administration and military through the M23. This concern, he said, stems from past experiences in the 1990s and early 2000s. He also said that ahead of the elections, President Felix Tshisekedi made strong statements about bringing peace to the eastern region, but those promises have largely fallen short.

As a representative of a German organization, he called for stronger Western diplomatic pressure on Rwanda, arguing that this is essential to maintain legitimacy with African and international partners, including within the UN system. “No one can deny anymore that Rwanda is backing the M23 – except maybe [President] Paul Kagame,” he said.

However, he said that the Congolese government also bears significant responsibility, particularly in addressing the weaknesses of its military. ” There’s no military solution to this,” he said. “The Congolese army is too weak, and we can see it every single day.”

Fred Bauma, a Congolese activist and Director of the Ebuteli Institute, warned that the conflict in eastern DR Congo is evolving into a regional war if it hasn’t already reached that stage. He said that Burundi’s growing military presence in the region, saying that M23’s advance into South Kivu poses a direct security threat to Burundi, compelling its government to act not just in support of the DR Congo but also to protect its own borders.

“The Congolese army is not in good shape… I don’t think there is any military solution to this conflict” he said. He said that the Congolese army struggled to defend key cities like Goma. He said that if Goma fell quickly, Bukavu would be even less capable of resisting.

Bauma warned of growing anti-Rwanda sentiment in cities like Goma and Bukavu, which could exacerbate tensions if the M23 attempts to control these areas through force and repression.

“We are already seeing the manifestation of that in Goma and other places occupied by the M23,” he said. “At the same time, the idea of direct negotiations between the Congolese government and the M23 remains deeply unpopular in Kinshasa due to historical mistrust and fears of Rwandan infiltration.

Past attempts at integrating rebel groups into the Congolese army through processes like “brassage and mixage” have fueled public skepticism, with many attributing the army’s failures solely to infiltration rather than addressing its broader structural issues. “The people overlook all other structural issues in the army and tend to explain everything by the fact that the army is infiltrated, which is probably true, but I don’t think it’s the only reason for the failure.”

He said that the Congolese government sees M23 as a proxy of Rwanda and believes negotiations should be held directly with the Rwandan government rather than with the rebel group. He said this stance contrasts with the position of the East African Community, which has pushed for direct negotiations with the M23.

“We see the Catholic and Protestant churches are trying to initiate a Congolese-led political process,” he said. “But that process is being seriously attacked by people close to the ruling power, the ruling political party in Kinshasa. And I think it’s very likely that the government will try to distance itself more and more from that process.”

Bauma criticized Rwanda’s recurring interventions in DR Congo, saying that while mineral resources are often cited as a primary driver, they are not the sole factor. He dismissed Rwanda’s justification of targeting the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda ( FDLR) as increasingly unconvincing, given its repeated military interventions in the DR Congo. “Every time Rwanda backs an armed group in the DR Congo, it actually produces the effect that Rwanda is trying to fight against,” he said.

South Africa’s diplomatic role

Kingsley Makhubela, a former South African public diplomat and risk analyst, questioned President Félix Tshisekedi’s ability to assert control over the military and navigate the ongoing crisis. “Discipline within the Congolese army has completely collapsed. Is Tshisekedi not a hostage of the military? Is he not fearful of attending regional meetings because he worries that, in his absence, the military may take over?” he asked.

Makhubela said that Tshisekedi has attended recent summits virtually rather than in person, raising concerns about his grip on power.

He criticized South Africa and SADC for initially adopting a militarized approach through the SAMIDRC mission, aimed at neutralizing the M23. “I hope by now they’ve learned a lesson that that’s not possible,” he said, arguing that diplomatic efforts should instead focus on persuading Tshisekedi to negotiate directly with the M23. He said that there is a need for integrating the M23 into the Congolese armed forces and broader society, dismissing fears of Rwandan infiltration as counterproductive. “Kinshasa needs to disabuse itself of the view that integrating the M23 is an infiltration,” he said.

“It’s misleading to hear politicians referring to SAMIDRC as a peacekeeping mission. It’s not,” he said. He also criticized the South African government for its lack of transparency regarding troop deployments, warning that public sentiment could turn volatile as casualties mount. “If the South African government had invested in trust and taken the public into confidence, some of these challenges wouldn’t be as severe.”

“But really, is that going to be sustainable in the absence of a negotiated settlement and the agreement that the cantonment would take place fairly and militia groups that are aligned to government would also be included?… Is the government in Kinshasa buying into these issues? These are issues that are making this conflict keep on changing all posts on a daily basis. And that’s where the challenges are,” he said.

Unpacking the root causes

Walters traced the re-emergence of the M23 in 2021 to a series of shifting regional dynamics and unresolved tensions. “If we go back in time to see what triggered the re-emergence of the M23, it tells us a lot about its root causes. The M23’s return in 2021 followed a period of re-engagement between Kinshasa and both Kampala and Kigali. While there was hope for improved relations, the approach was somewhat shallow, with an eagerness for quick success,” said Walters.

“The M23’s return in 2021 followed shallow re-engagement efforts between Kinshasa, Kampala, and Kigali, driven by a desire for quick success.”

She said that President Tshisekedi’s initial efforts to improve relations with Uganda and Rwanda offered a glimmer of hope, but these efforts were ultimately shallow and short-lived. “There was a desire to see a quick improvement, and it was a useful political success for Tshisekedi, who was still hamstrung by the Kabila majority in parliament at the time,” she said. However, the relationship with Rwanda quickly deteriorated, particularly after Kinshasa granted Uganda and Burundi bilateral military access to eastern DR Congo while denying the same to Rwanda. “That was certainly a factor,” she said.

Walters said that while the illicit trade in Congolese minerals benefits Rwanda, it is not the primary driver of the conflict. “We didn’t need the M23 to reemerge for Rwanda to access resources. That’s not what this is about,” she said. Instead, she said, Rwanda’s long-term ambition is to exert control over key parts of North and South Kivu. “The M23 has been setting up parallel administrations and even appointed a governor for Goma. This is part of a long-term plan that Rwanda has implemented in different ways over the years,” she said.

The integration of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), the precursor to the M23, into the Congolese army in previous years allowed Rwanda to maintain significant influence in eastern DR Congo. “That integration was never really an integration because the command and control structures were never broken up and it is something that allowed the Rwandan government to continue to control Eastern DR Congo for a very long time,” said Walters. “When there was an attempt to break away from that, we saw the 2012-2013 crisis reemerge,” she said.

Walters also addressed the role of regional rivalries, particularly between Rwanda and Uganda, in fueling the conflict. She recalled how the two nations cooperated during the 1990s and early 2000s wars but later fell out over resources and competing interests. “The city of Kisangani became a war zone in 2000 as Ugandan and Rwandan soldiers shot at each other and that relationship has always been a key player,” she said.

“A lot of these conflicts are exported to eastern DR Congo and then play themselves out there.”

The weak governance in eastern DR Congo, combined with the presence of numerous armed groups, has made the region a battleground for external actors. “A lot of these conflicts are exported to eastern DR Congo and then play themselves out there,” Walters explained, citing Burundi’s deployment of troops to combat rebels operating from Congolese territory as an example. She also said Uganda’s dual role in the conflict, ostensibly supporting Kinshasa while allowing the M23 to use its territory. “Uganda has been able to fly under the radar in past conflicts, and it’s doing the same in this one and it claims to be on Kinshasa’s side, but of course has allowed tacitly the M23 to use its territory…”

“We’re heading towards an escalation, and interstate wars are potentially possible,” she said stressing the need to address the crisis as a regional conflict.

“We have to treat this as a regional war and address it as such and I think that that’s extremely important. And that’s one of the key reasons why I think, I mean, it’s not necessarily why Kinshasa won’t negotiate with the M23, but it’s going to be a very big challenge on what one of the demands the M23 is going to be having about integrating into the Congolese army,” she said.

Walters praised Angola’s role in the Luanda process, saying that they have remained invested and mediated well. However, she criticized the agreement for being skewed, as it prioritizes Rwanda’s security concerns over the actual threat posed by M23 in eastern DR Congo. “The peace accord doesn’t even address the presence of the M23 clearly, nor does it speak clearly about Rwanda’s role,” she said. “It’s very much walking around the issue of what Rwanda’s role is now, and I think it’s a relatively misplaced starting point.”

She also questioned the logic behind focusing on the FDLR, a group that no longer poses a serious threat to Rwanda. “If Rwanda truly wanted to defeat them, with the many thousands of troops it has in eastern DR Congo, it could do that,” she said.

Walters also questioned the practicality of the Nairobi process, which began as an East African Community (EAC) initiative to facilitate disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for armed groups in eastern DR Congo. While the process initially aimed to include the M23, Kinshasa’s refusal to engage with the group derailed those efforts. “To try and restart the Nairobi process at this point, when you have so much conflict in the east and most armed groups are engaged on the opposite side of the M23, is very much out of sync with the reality,” she said.

A move to integrate the M23 into the Congolese army would be complex, she warned and could set a problematic precedent. “If you do that with the M23, then all the other armed groups who were your enemies yesterday, but today are your allies, when they come to the negotiating table, we’ll be making similar demands. So I think that it is very, very complicated,” she said.

Makhubela said that integrating all militia groups into a new military structure is key to achieving lasting peace in the DR Congo.

“At the crux of finding a durable solution is the integration of all militia groups into a new military dispensation in the Congo…Leaving any group outside this framework would risk continued instability. Any group left out of a future dispensation has the potential to cause havoc in the Congo,” said Makhubela.

“The eastern DR Congo has clearly become an epicenter of all sorts of civil militia groups, and the Congolese government has no control over that,” he said. “These groups have access to resources that allow them to perpetuate the conflict.” He also said that ethnicity often plays a significant role in such intractable conflicts, as groups mobilize along ethnic lines, further complicating efforts to achieve peace.

On the issue of the FDLR, Makhubela acknowledged past joint military operations aimed at neutralizing the group, which Rwanda has long viewed as a threat. He welcomed recent agreements by the East African Community and SADC to address the group as part of a broader solution. “If any militia group is to be left out of any future military dispensation, I don’t think there will be any durable peace,” he said.

“Are they military all the time? Are they only called upon when things go wrong?”

Bauma argued that integrating armed groups into the Congolese doesn’t make it stronger – it does the opposite.

“The history of the FARDC is the history of successive integrations without creating a trained, equipped, and professional army,” he said. “And so redoing the same and expecting a different solution in this case, I don’t think that would be the best idea.”

“The weakness of the Congolese army today is one of the reasons for this escalation, and weakening it even more will not be the solution,” he said. He expressed skepticism about the government’s recent initiative to create a “defense reserve” for former combatants, questioning its feasibility and effectiveness. “Are they military all the time? Are they only called upon when things go wrong? I don’t know how that would be functional,” he said.

Bauma said that concessions to Rwanda and the M23’s predecessor, the CNDP, had failed to prevent renewed violence. “The solution they gave was a joint military operation against the FDLR. They did it. They integrated people into the provincial government. But it didn’t prevent Rwanda or the M23 from starting a war again,” he said. He pointed out that President Tshisekedi had gone further than his predecessors in granting Rwanda access to business and military interventions, yet the conflict persists. “If all that wasn’t the solution, what is the real issue?” Bauma asked.

“When these militias negotiate, their integration into the national army is often linked to political demands, and so it goes around and around,” said Walters.

She said that integrating militias has historically weakened the FARDC rather than strengthened it. “A good army would change so many things in the DR Congo, including the experience of civilians in areas where the FARDC are present,” she said, “but constant integration of militias into the army has encouraged the emergence of more armed groups, as it provides an easy channel into political and military power.”

“It’s been tried, and it hasn’t been very successful in the past,” said Walters.

External actors

Kerstan said that many Congolese believe Western countries, particularly the U.S. and European nations, benefit from the ongoing conflict and have little interest in finding a lasting solution.

“I think the Congolese would answer you that especially the West… they are benefiting from the current conflict and the status quo,” he said. However, he cautioned against oversimplifying the issue, adding, “I think it’s too easy to say.”

He pointed to growing anti-Western sentiment in the DR Congo, fueled by a sense of abandonment by the international community. “Congolese feel left behind in the conflict in the east and by the international community, despite efforts like MONUSCO, which spent billions without achieving lasting peace,” he said. This sentiment, Kerstan said, has fueled protests against Western embassies, including attacks on Belgian, French, and American diplomatic offices in Kinshasa.

“The expectation is always that the West must act – the U.S. must act.”

Kerstan also spoke about the contrasting roles of global powers in the conflict. He said that while China has largely avoided criticism despite its significant economic presence in the DR Congo, the West remains the primary target of Congolese expectations. “The expectation is always that the West must act – the U.S. must act,” he said.

He compared the current U.S. administration involvement to the Obama administration’s stance during the M23 crisis of 2012-2013. He warned that failing to address these expectations could further erode Western credibility in the region. He said that Rwanda’s stability and business-friendly environment make it an attractive partner for Western nations, particularly in the mineral trade. “If you’re an international company… it’s very, very, very difficult in the current situation to do this in Eastern DR Congo,” he said. “Rwanda is a very good partner for the West, but we must also address the legitimate concerns of the DR Congo.”

He praised the Congolese Foreign Minister for her efforts to advocate for DR Congo’s case internationally, including at the Munich Security Conference, and called for Western actors to use their leverage to facilitate a regional solution. “The final solution can’t come from the West, but we can facilitate and use our contacts to support a resolution,” Kerstan said.

“Many countries in the West, as well as others like China and Qatar, have leverage over Rwanda,” said Bauma, saying that Rwanda relies heavily on foreign aid, which makes up about 30% of its budget. He said that Rwanda’s investment in its international reputation, particularly in tourism and peacekeeping contributions. “At some point, I think action, like pressure on Rwanda via sanctions or via cutting aid, may be effective,” he said. However, he said that he doesn’t believe putting a Rwandan official on the sanction list today will change much on the ground.

Bauma said that the conflict in eastern DR Congo could soon merge with broader political tensions across the country, leading to nationwide instability.

“As the M23 advances, the conflict in the east will merge with political tensions in the rest of the country. At that point, it will no longer be just about eastern DR Congo – it will be about the complete instability of the country,” he said. He urged the international community to act quickly, “We have a small window of opportunity to pressure both the Congolese and Rwandan governments to implement a ceasefire and return to negotiations. In a few weeks, the conflict could take a completely different shape, and the tools that might work today will be even less effective.”

“The responsibility of the West is linked to the memory of 30 years of war and the role they played in reinforcing one country over another,” he said.

He said that, regardless of current policies, countries like Germany, France, Belgium, and the U.S. are often perceived as responsible for the ongoing instability due to their historical involvement in the region. “Even if China does nothing to support the DR Congo, they are not the ones who will be held to account,” he said.

Makhubela also discussed the challenges of harmonizing Regional Economic Communities (RECs), pointing out that the African Union’s initial agreement on REC harmonization has not been effective. He cited the example of Tshisekedi, who has been able to shift alliances between the East African Community and SADC based on strategic interests.

“That has never worked, and part of the problem we have now is that Tshisekedi can cherry-pick what he wants. The East African Community, for example, refuses to let their military fight militias; they see themselves as peacekeeping forces. Because of those differences, he decided to let them leave and opted for the SADC instead,” he said. “They cherry-pick what works for them.”

Makhubela said that the Dar es Salaam summit was a step forward in harmonizing approaches, however, he criticized the lack of funding from RECs and member states. He said that without a financial commitment from member states, initiatives like demobilization and reintegration will fail.