Gaddafi’s fall

According to sources close to the Libyan leader, Gaddafi was angry with Museveni because he suspected that the Ugandan president had deliberately misled him about an offer by former US President George Bush regarding the destruction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). According to these sources, Museveni had told Gaddafi that US president, George Bush, would remove sanctions on Libya and open doors for American investments into Libya if he (Gaddafi) destroyed his WMD.

Museveni, sources say, advised Gaddafi to destroy is WMDs close to the November 2004 re-election campaign. The Libyan leader did as told and was convinced that he had given Bush a decisive campaign advantage in that election. However, after his reelection, Bush did not honour the agreement. When Gaddafi complained, he was told by key people in British intelligence that Museveni had sold him a lie.

But did Museveni sell a lie? Well, since he came to power, Museveni has developed strong relations with Western powers especially the United States and United Kingdom. Yet during the late 1980s and early 1990s, these countries had extremely bad relations with Libya and had declared Gaddafi a pariah. In 1986, US president, Ronald Reagan bombed Libya with a view to kill Gaddafi. The planes killed the Libyan leader’s daughter.

After the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland, the US and UK governments accused Gaddafi of complicity in the crime and imposed sanctions on Libya. Yet Museveni retained strong relations with the two powers while at the same time keeping Gaddafi as a close ally. Why did the Americans and the British remain close to Museveni in spite of his relations with Gaddafi who they loathed?

Highly informed sources say that Museveni’s relationship with Gaddafi did not undermine his relations with the Americans and the British because the Ugandan president has been a major link between the two sides. First, Museveni played a key role in the resolution of the stand-off over Lockerbie. Second, he was central during the negotiations leading to Libya destroying its programs to develop Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD). Knowledge of the details of Museveni’s work on this front lends credence that he was indeed a person in a position to sell to Gaddafi a believable story.

Although the world hailed South African leader Nelson Mandela for helping the US and UK governments resolve their differences with Libya, the unsung hero of this endeavour was actually Museveni. According to information available to The Independent, the contention revolved around four major issues which the US had made conditional on removing sanctions against Libya. The Americans and British wanted Libya to condemn international terrorism and stop financing it. Second, they wanted Libya to disarm its WMDs and also to stop any program of producing more. Third, they insisted that Libya publicly apologise for Lockerbie. And finally they wanted Libya to compensate the victims of the Lockerbie bombing.

For some years, Libya played a game of hide and seek with the US and UK on these four points. Officially, it accepted these conditions: first claiming that it does not finance terrorism and has always condemned it. Second, the Libyans claimed not to have any WMDs – insisting that the few they had were aimed at Israel. Third, they refused to apologise for the bombing of the Pan Am airliner, saying they were not involved in its bombing. However, they offered give money to the families of victims – as a humanitarian gesture.

These positions had created an impasse. In April 2002, Museveni travelled to Washington DC for a meeting with Bush. During the meeting, Bush told Museveni that there were many emissaries – the South Africans, the Chinese and others – all going to DC to negotiate on behalf of Libya. I want you to be my go between, Bush told Museveni as he patted the Ugandan president on the shoulder. Museveni answered that he cannot give any promises but would travel to Libya and seek Gaddafi’s indulgence.

Thus, instead of coming directly to Uganda, Museveni went to Libya where Gaddafi agreed to the deal that Uganda’s president would be the single go-between between him and the Americans. Upon returning to Kampala, Museveni called a meeting of his advisors and broke the news of the deal. But the then minister for Foreign Affairs, James Wapakhabulo, advised that Gaddafi should put his commitment in writing.

Thus, on June 12, 2002, Wapa travelled to Libya where Gaddafi officially wrote that Museveni would be the link with Bush. Wapa returned with the good news on June 19.

Less than a year later, Museveni was at the height of his influence in Washington DC. Thus, when he began his campaign for a third term, Museveni knew that DC would only make impotent gestures of protest. The only centre of opposition to the project seemed to be the State Department which had been deliberately kept out of the loop. It is in this way that Museveni played a major role in Libya’s disarmament.

It seems therefore that in spite of his problems with Gaddafi, Museveni was a net beneficiary from the relationship with Libya’s eccentric president. Indeed, according to Charles Onyango-Obbo, the Nation Media Group’s Executive Editor for Africa and Digital Media, Museveni may have involved himself in the “save Gaddafi effort” because of the key role he played in the resolution of Lockerbie and the WMD issue, a factor that gave the Ugandan president critical geostrategic clout.

According to Obbo, Museveni may have realised that if Gaddafi was removed without his participation, he would have lost a key geostrategic advantage especially in his relationship with the Americans and the British. If Gaddafi survived, he would have been grateful to Museveni for saving him while the Ugandan president would maintain his position as a key power-broker between the British and Americans on one hand and Gaddafi on the other. He may also have thought that by organising a common African voice against NATO, he would emerge as key player on the global scene.

“But Museveni also had a correct argument on Libya,” Obbo went on, “He has been asking NATO to help the AU forces in Somalia to end impunity by Al Shabaab that is causing massive loss of life there – both directly through terrorism and indirectly though politically induced famine.”

Obbo said: “By questioning why NATO could do what it has done in Libya when it is exactly what the AU has been demanding for them to do in Somalia and they had refused, Museveni was able to expose the fact that NATO’s presence in Libya was not driven by humanitarian considerations. He was able to show that NATO’s involvement in Libya was not aimed at stabilising the country but was driven by ulterior motives.”

Obbo also says that at a very personal level, Gaddafi was the only African leader willing to publically support Museveni’s desire to stay in power. So although he was obnoxious and kept poking Museveni in the eye, he was nonetheless an asset for the Ugandan president. Certainly, through Gaddafi’s fall, Museveni will have lost an ally in the Africa long-serving leaders’ club.

Gaddafi’s fall will certainly leave Museveni weakened regionally but certainly not undone. He still has many cards in his geostrategic positioning – Somalia where Ugandan troops fight America’s war of keeping suspected terrorists at bay, and South Sudan where the evolution of a new state presents risks to regional stability.

In both cases, Museveni is seen in London, Washington and Paris as the man who contributes significantly to the stability of the region and thereby saves the Americans and British the trouble of being called upon to support a complex humanitarian catastrophe if things went out of control. Already the Uganda government has announced its readiness to work with any successor to Gaddafi.

However, the future of Libya without Gaddafi is unclear. The rebels who have taken control of most of the country lack a unified organisation and a shared ideology. Yet they are armed in a country sitting on billions of oil revenues. Agreeing on who controls oil revenues among men wielding AK 47 assault rifles without the process degenerating into a bloodbath is certainly going to be one of the miracles of the 20th century.