Museveni and the army

Comparing Zimbabwe

A look at the Zimbabwean situation reveals that until recently, the army has appeared to be firmly behind Mugabe. After all, since 2004 Mugabe has ensured that it is headed by Gen. Constantino Chiwenga; a 61-year old illiterate war-veteran who joined Mugabe’s bush fighters when he was 17 years old and was promoted to head all the armed forces in Zimbabwe in spite of being caught buying answers to the only exam he appears to have ever sat – at the Zimbabwe Army Staff College.

The only credentials that mattered to Mugabe appear to have been that Chiwenga is a war-veteran, brutal, and from the same Shona tribe as him. In fact, Mugabe ensured that even the Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa is his longtime ally and from the same Shona tribe. But they parted ways when Mugabe attempted to impose his wife as his successor. Although all three are Shona, the military chief and the vice president are from the Karanga sub-group, while Mugabe is from the Zezuru sub-group.

Ironically, their disagreement was first openly aired in a fight over the so-called Command Agriculture Programme which is similar in structure, objective, and implementation as the Operation wealth Creation headed by Museveni’s brother Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho aka Salim Saleh.

Family affairs

Museveni likes to name Gen. Saleh to sensitive jobs. He used him to set a precedent of appointing serving soldiers into his cabinet and speculation is now high that he might finally appoint his son, Maj. Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, into cabinet just as he also did with his wife Janet Museveni.

So far, Museveni’s keeping Muhoozi in the army is also seen as strategic because, observers say, he believes that for one to have a successful political career they must maintain a hold on the army.

It is a belief many former leaders like Uganda’s Idi Amin, Libya’s Col. Muammar Gaddafi, Mugabe and several deposed African dictators have had.

Museveni, however, justifies deployment of the military in otherwise civilian territory by claiming that he is trying to sort out inefficiencies and poor service delivery, but critics say his real aims are political, involving holding on to power.

Mao explains that the version of accountability Museveni seeks “is not democratic but bureaucratic”, which is what you have in the military.

“There (military),” Mao says, “no General accounts to lower ranks. They just issue orders and they are executed without questions.”

He cites two examples where Museveni has deployed the military with these intentions; the Identity Card project and Operation Wealth Creation (OWC).

President Museveni appointed the late Gen. Aronda Nyakairima as Minister of Internal Affairs in 2013 saying he wanted him to “sort out the ID project mess”.

In reality, Mao says, Museveni’s motive was to gain control of the national register of citizens and subsequently control the resultant voter data that would be used in the 2016 elections. Nyakairima had been the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and a close confidante of the President.

In the case of OWC, Museveni has put his brother; Gen. Saleh, in charge. This programme, which is designed to improve livelihoods and reduce poverty through distribution of improved inputs to agriculture, is a major government project. With a budget of Shs300 billion in the 2017/18 national budget, it is bigger that many government departments and agencies. The budget for OWC is over 30% of the Ministry of Agriculture budget where it is domiciled. In reality, according to Mao, Museveni appointed his brother to head OWC because it is a vote gathering venture that supports only farmers who are known supporters of Museveni and a money conduit for the ruling NRM party. Mao says Operation Wealth Creation’s motive is to recruit the majority poor peasants into the NRM.

When the strategic Ministry of Works and Transport was embroiled in a slew of corruption scandals, and shoddy and delayed projects, Museveni again resorted to a soldier to sort it out. He appointed another former CDF, Gen. Katumba Wamala as Minister of State for Works to, among others; implement the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR).

Observers say that for Museveni, who shot to power in 1986 through a guerrilla war promising to end an era of destructive military rule and usher in civilian rule and democracy, to resort to governing through the army is a major indictment.

However, his handlers quickly dismiss any criticism and point to parliament, courts and cabinet to argue that Museveni’s is a civilian government.

But the de facto leader of the radical anti-Museveni movement, Kizza Besigye, who has challenged Museveni in presidential elections four times, says Museveni’s government has always been “a military regime”.

Even those who find Besigye’s stance a little too harsh appear to agree that tendencies of military rule are now hard to ignore.

Many point at Museveni’s well-practiced habit of always donning military fatigues (which are clear symbols of military rule) while addressing critical government meetings and gatherings. Although he is officially retired from the army, Museveni also routinely carries a rifle.