MUSEVENI: The importance of the Galamba-Bireembo Trek

COMMENT | Yoweri Kaguta Museveni |  An armed conflict has got four levels: a war; a campaign;an operation; and a battle. All these levels can either be short, like the 6 days war of 1967 between Israel and the Arabs or a protracted one such as the 30 years war between the Protestants and the Roman Catholics in Germany, the 100 years War between England and France, the 1^st and 2^nd World Wars between Germany and its allies and Britain, Russia, the USA and its allies.

In the case of Uganda, the second Resistance War started on the 6^th of February, 1981 and major battles ended with the capture of Kampala on the 26^th of January, 1986.  Within that 5 years’ War, there were four campaigns, a number of operations and many battles.

A war means the whole conflict, from the beginning to the end ─ in this case from Kabaamba on the 6^th of February to Kampala, the 26^th of January, 1986.

The campaigns were four:

–     The gun-raising campaign from the 6^th of February, 1981, to September, 1985, when, in addition to the 4,000 rifles we had captured from the UNLA, we received the 5,000 rifles from Mwalimu with 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition and the 800 rifles we had received from Gaddaffi, with 800,000 rounds of ammunition.

–     The second campaign was the campaign to open the second front in the Rwenzori Mountains, starting in March, 1985, until the battle of Rubona in June, 1985.

–     The third campaign was the expansion that started in September, 1985, with the massive recruitment of fighters from Western Uganda that boosted the NRA from 4,000 fighters to 20,000 (fresh recruits and UNLA captured soldiers being integrated into the Resistance War).

All these 3 campaigns were within the strategic Defensive Phase ─ when the resistance was on the defensive, but fighting offensive battles and operations within the strategic defence.

–     The 4^th campaign coincided with the opening of the strategic counter-offensive on the 17^th of January, 1986.  Our forces, advancing on five axises (routes), swept towards Kampala in the centre and Masindi and Karuma in the West.

The axises were: Kampala-Masaka Road (1^st Battalion ─ Pecos and Mugisha Fred, 5^th Battalion ─ Kashaka and Kashillingi); Kinoni-Mpigi Road and Mityana Road axis ─ 7^th Battalion ─ Kyaligonza and Stanley Muhangyi; Hoima Road axis ─ 11^th Battalion ─ Chefe Ali; Bombo road-blocking ─ 13^th Battalion ─ Ivan Koreta; the Western Axis ─ Hoima-Masindi ─ Tinyefuuza ─ Peter Kerim, with the 19^th Battalion.  The 3^rd Battalion, under Lumumba, was in Reserve with me and Saleh, 21^st Battalion was in Reserve at Kasese and the 9^th Battalion was in Reserve at Kabale-Kigyezi.  The 9^th Battalion was under Julius Kihaanda and the 21^st Battalion was under Benon Tumukunde in Kasese, watching the suspected moves of Mobutu in Congo.  The 15^th Battalion, under Samson Mande, was created.

I am referring to these forces as battalions, but, in reality, they were Regiments ─ equivalent to two of our present day battalions of 736 persons each. One of them, the 19^th Battalion under Peter Kerim, was 1,900 fighters.  The others were, on the average, 1,500 persons. We had done this deliberately so as to economize on the leadership resources (commanding officers) that were not so plentiful.  If you have one good CO, why do you only put 5 companies, 146 persons each, under him? Why does he not provide leadership for 10 or more companies?  This battalion will then, do work for 2/3 of a brigade (3 battalions), but under the leadership of the one good leader.

This trek, therefore, is on just a portion of one of the Operations ─ the Kabaamba Operation.  This was within the campaign of gun-raising.  The Operation started on the 22^nd of December, 1985, from Sebuguzi ─ involving 1,500 fighters ─ armed and unarmed.

I, personally, oversaw this operation, with Saleh as the Operational Commander of the force.  This was the Mobile Brigade comprised of: 1^st, 3^rd and 5^th Battalions, with alot of commandos (unarmed fighters).