Rwanda’s biggest security dilemma

Therefore, to understand the complexity of the current flare up in fighting in DRC is to first appreciate the fears and temptations people in Kigali face. First, the Tutsi militias in Congo, even without Kigali’s active support, act as a buffer between Rwanda and the FDLR. Second, they protect local Tutsi populations that face existential threats from the FDLR and other Congolese communities. Third, these militias and their warlords ensure order in a region where the Congolese state in almost absent. Therefore, their defeat would present a key security challenge to Rwanda. Hence Kigali finds itself in a position where it cannot support the Tutsi militias in Congo while at the same time it cannot condemn their cause.

To resolve this dilemma, Kigali adopted a two pronged approach: One short term and tactical; the other long term and strategic. In the short term, Kigali would not support any Tutsi militias in eastern Congo. However, it would not act against them either – and this is exactly what Kinshasa and the international community would like to see. Thus, whenever individuals inside Rwandan society are involved in helping their kith and kin across the border, Kigali refuses to play the role of Congolese policeman. It just turns a blind eye and pretends it does not know. For example, assuming Rwandan security services got intelligence that some individuals inside the country were actively raising funds and meeting some of the militia leaders. Kigali would not arrest them. It would pretend it did not know. Assuming Rwandan officials heard that one of the militia leaders was in some village in Rwanda, the government would again pretend it does not know.

It is in this context that some human rights groups that claim that some of the rebel leaders enter Rwanda could be telling at least a slice of the truths. Kigali is clear on two things: It is not going to play cop for Kinshasa or the international community. At a press conference in Kigali on June 19, President Paul Kagame made it clear: these warlords live in DRC which has 17,000 UN troops costing US$ 1.2 billion a year – 50 percent of Rwanda’s annual budget. Why can’t this force arrest these rebel commanders with all the capacity it has? Why transfer the responsibility to Rwanda?

Second, Rwanda government officials are not allowed to deal with rebel leaders and other Congolese in whatever shape and form. When information emerged that some top generals in the Rwanda security services had been involved in meetings and financial transactions with Congolese businessmen early this year, President Kagame placed them under house arrest.

However, Kigali understands that this cannot be a long term policy to solving the problem. The source of Rwanda’s security vulnerability is the long standing governance issue in DRC i.e. the absence of an effective and functional state. The solution for DRC lies in reconstructing the state. Indeed, ironically Kigali is even more concerned about security in the eastern DRC than Kinshasa. For example, Rwanda is positioning itself as the region’s main high-end tourism destination. Its prize in this strategy is the mountain gorillas right at the border with DRC. Nothing threatens this strategic interest than insecurity in eastern DRC as it scares away tourists – but most especially rich ones whom it charges top dollar.

Secondly, Rwanda is making a couple of strategic investments right at the border with DRC. First, it is developing a methane gas plant in Lake Kivu, just a stone throw from the border with Congo, to produce 150 MW of electricity to supply the country. Kigali has further signed a multimillion dollar joint venture investment with New Forest Company, a consortium of Britain’s high net worth individuals along with HSBC Bank and the European Investment Bank. The consortium are going to cut and replant Nyungwe Forest and develop a regional timber and furniture industry on one hand and on the other, produce 100MW of electricity. Finally, Kigali is beginning to increase its mining and export of Coltan – located in the same place.

Kigali is acutely aware that insecurity in eastern Congo would be a strategic vulnerability in its pursuit of its Vision 2020. And it is also aware that it cannot attract and sustain serious investments if eastern DRC is controlled by warlords – however closely tied to Kigali they may be. Rwanda’s leaders are acutely aware that their vital national strategic interests are therefore best served by a stable and effective state in DRC. Kigali also knows that it cannot manage Congo. But it is confident that it can help Congolese find a solution to their problems.

As a foreign policy strategy, Rwanda has long abandoned its earlier faith in influencing regime change in neighbouring states. By 2004, Rwanda had also abandoned any ambitions to fight proxy wars, realising that they may achieve short term tactical objectives at the price of creating long term strategic vulnerabilities. This lesson was driven home by Kigali’s fallout with former Congolese president and erstwhile ally, Laurent Kabila; coupled with its fallout with Uganda in Congo. The lesson from these two experiences, every strategist in Kigali will tell you, was that helping someone capture power in another country does not automatically guarantee a durable alliance between you and them.

RPF had been supported by Uganda under President Yoweri Museveni. But this did not sustain the alliance as the two countries degenerated into hostilities and finally fought in Congo. Equally, Rwanda had helped Kabila and installed him president in Kinshasa. They turned enemies and fought pitched battles. Kigali realised that it has always fought more allies than those it was not related to. The lesson sunk: you can make a king, but you cannot control them once you have made them. So Kigali has no ambitions to make another king in Congo; its own strained relations with Congolese Tutsi always works as a reminder that it should not rely on them entirely. The view is that government should always seek to deal with the leaders their neighbours produce rather than seek to influence who emerges as leader.  Therefore, Kigali decided that in the long term, it needed to engage Kinshasa and leverage whatever connections it had with the Tutsi militias to arrive at a solution for eastern Congo. Rwanda offered to help bring the militias to agree with Kinshasa on a peace deal. Kinshasa agreed to integrate the militias into its army but leave them in control of their troops to protect their communities. The two sides also agreed that Rwanda would send its army into eastern Congo to fight the FDLR. Even today, Rwanda has its special forces inside eastern DRC who have been conducting joint operations with the Congolese army. This offers the best possible solution to the DRC crisis and should be the agreement that the international community should push Kagame and Kabila to uphold rather than condemn one side.

amwenda@independent.co.ug